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UNTANGLING THE COURT’S SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE TO 
ALLOW FOR GREATER RESPECT OF TRIBAL AUTHORITY IN 
ADDRESSING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
LAUREN OPPENHEIMER* 
Domestic violence in Indian country has increasingly become a subject 
of concern for Congress over the past fifty years.  While domestic violence 
is a systemic problem throughout the United States, Native American wom-
en experience higher rates of domestic violence than any other group.12  In-
deed, “American Indian and Alaska Native women ‘are 2.5 times more like-
ly to be raped or sexually assaulted than women in the United States in 
general.’”3  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) esti-
mates that roughly forty-six percent of American Indian and Alaska Native 
women have been physically abused by an intimate partner.4  Further, the 
U.S. Department of Justice reports that approximately sixty percent of Na-
tive American women have been victimized by an intimate partner.5 
The pressing problems posed by the disproportionately high incidence 
of domestic violence against Native American women are further exacer-
bated by the “‘complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law,’ govern-
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is dedicated to domestic violence advocates who are all too often unappreciated for their meaning-
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 1.  This Comment adopts the U.S. Department of Justice’s use of the term “domestic vio-
lence,” which defines the term “as a pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by 
one partner to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner.”  Domestic Vio-
lence, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/ovw/domestic-violence (last visited Apr. 2, 
2017). 
 2.  United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1959 (2016) (citing 151 CONG. REC. 9061 
(2005) (remarks of Sen. McCain)). 
 3.  Id. (quoting ATTORNEY GEN.’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AM. INDIAN/ALASKA NATIVE 
CHILDREN EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ENDING VIOLENCE SO CHILDREN 
CAN THRIVE 38 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/defendingchildhood/pages/at 
tachments/2015/03/23/ending_violence_so_children_can_thrive.pdf). 
 4.  Id. (citing MICHAEL BLACK ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, 
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 40 
(2011), https://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS_report2010-a.pdf). 
 5.  Memorandum from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Vice President of the United States (July 21, 2011). 
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ing Indian country.”6  Tribal courts, for example, have struggled to enforce 
their tribes’ criminal laws against Native American perpetrators of domestic 
violence because state and federal laws have curbed their sentencing author-
ity.7  It was not until the latter part of the twentieth century that Congress 
extended the federal government’s jurisdiction through the Major Crimes 
Act to address criminal offenses for which both the perpetrator and the vic-
tim are Native Americans.8  This intervention, however, has not been entire-
ly positive.9  In fact, arguably, it has undermined tribal sovereignty and the 
ability of Native American tribes to directly address the violence that occurs 
in their communities.10  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United 
States v. Bryant,11 which upheld a repeat offender law that expands federal 
authority over Native American domestic violence offenders, affirms the 
notion that Congress enjoys virtually unchecked power in this area.12  The 
Court’s decision could further minimize the degree of respect or deference 
Congress accords tribal sovereignty.13  Less respect for or deference to trib-
al sovereignty would impede Native American tribes’ authority to address 
domestic violence in their communities and potentially undermine the ef-
fectiveness of related policies.14 
This Comment analyzes legal and academic positions regarding tribal 
sovereignty,15 applies these positions to the difficulties tribes face in enforc-
ing domestic violence laws,16 and advocates for a shift in the mainstream 
understanding of tribal sovereignty toward one that is more respectful of 
tribal autonomy.17  This Comment additionally addresses what that shift 
must entail when considering whether a law respects tribal sovereignty18 
and proposes amending the law at issue in United States v. Bryant to poten-
tially include a waiver provision that would both increase the degree of con-
                                                          
 6.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1959–60 (quoting Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 n.1 (1990)). 
 7.  Id. at 1960.  For instance, at the time Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 117(a), the Indian Civ-
il Rights Act limited tribal court sentences to a maximum of one year of imprisonment.  Indian 
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968).  While Congress has since in-
creased the court’s sentencing authority to a maximum of three years of imprisonment, “few tribes 
have employed this enhanced sentencing authority.”  Bryant, 136 U.S. at 1960. 
 8.  18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012); see also Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1961. 
 9.  See infra Parts II.A, II.C. 
 10.  See infra Part II.A. 
 11.  136 S. Ct. at 1954. 
 12.  Cf. id. at 1968–69 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[U]ntil the Court rejects the fiction that 
Congress possesses plenary power over Indian affairs, our precedents will continue to be based on 
the paternalistic theory that Congress must assume all-encompassing control . . . .”). 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  See infra Part II.C. 
 15.  See infra Part I.B. 
 16.  See infra Part II.C. 
 17.  See infra Part II.D. 
 18.  See infra Part II.C. 
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trol accorded to the tribes in prosecuting repeat domestic violence offenders 
and safeguard sovereignty.19 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Section A of this Part provides a general overview of the prevalence of 
domestic violence among Native Americans.20  Section B then outlines the 
majority opinion in United States v. Bryant, which contained only a mini-
mal analysis of tribal sovereignty.21  Section C focuses specifically on how 
the Court has analyzed tribal sovereignty over time by tracing the doctrine 
from its Marshall-era roots to Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Bryant.  
                                                          
 19.  See infra Part II.D. 
 20.  As an initial matter, because there are many different terms used to refer to similar sub-
jects within this body of law, this Comment will use the term “Native American,” except in quot-
ed materials.  It should be noted that there is a great deal of debate regarding proper terminology 
in this field.  Michael Yellow Bird, What We Want to Be Called: Indigenous Peoples’ Perspec-
tives on Racial and Ethnic Identity Labels, 23 AM. INDIAN Q. 1, 1–2 (1999) (noting that, while 
some terms such as “American Indian” and “Native American” may be more commonly used than 
others, “no clear consensus exists on which label is most preferable”).  The federal government 
uses the terms “Indian,” “Indian tribe,” and “tribe,” in the following manner: “Indian” refers to 
all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now un-
der Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members who 
were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, 
and shall further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood. 
5 U.S.C. § 479 (2012).  “Indian tribe” and “tribe” refers to “any Indian Tribe, organized band, 
pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation.”  Id.  The term “Indian Country” is used refer 
to:  
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the Unit-
ed States Government . . .  (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of 
the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, 
and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the In-
dian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running 
through the same. 
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). 
 21.  The Court’s sovereignty analysis with respect to Congress’s purported plenary power 
over Native American tribes is relegated to roughly one paragraph.  See Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 
1961–62 (majority opinion).  That paragraph reads:  
Although federal law generally governs in Indian country, Congress has long excluded 
from federal-court jurisdiction crimes committed by an Indian against another Indian.  
In the Major Crimes Act, Congress authorized federal jurisdiction over enumerated 
grave criminal offenses when the perpetrator is an Indian and the victim is “another In-
dian or other person . . . .”  
Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012), and then quoting id. § 1153)).  Jus-
tice Thomas observed that the majority’s reliance on a case that is over one century old to support 
its position that Congress enjoys plenary power over Native American tribes demonstrates the 
minimal effort that given in analyzing whether the law offended tribal sovereignty.  See id. at 
1968 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Over a century later, Kagama endures as the foundation of this 
doctrine, and the Court has searched in vain for any constitutional justification for this unfettered 
power.”). 
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This Part, by comparing background information on domestic violence with 
the Court’s tribal sovereignty jurisprudence separately, reflects the Court’s 
failure to develop a jurisprudence that recognizes Native American auton-
omy to address domestic violence in their communities. 
A.  Domestic Violence in Indian Country 
Domestic violence continues to affect Native American women at dis-
proportionately high rates.22  For instance, compared to Caucasian women 
who experience battery at a rate of 8 per 1,000, “Indian women experience 
battery at a rate of 23.2 per 1,000.”23  Native American women experience 
sexual assaults at a rate of 7 per 1,000, “compared with 4 per 1,000 among 
Black Americans, 3 per 1,000 among Caucasians, and 2 per 1,000 among 
Hispanic women, and 1 per 1,000 among Asian women.”24  Congress, in 
researching the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”), even found that 
from 1979–1992, not only was homicide among the leading causes of death 
for Native American women in the fifteen-to-thirty-four age bracket, but 
also that seventy-five percent of those deaths were perpetrated by the vic-
tim’s family or acquaintances.25 
Recognizing these harsh realities for Native American women, Con-
gress included a new title in the 2005 VAWA Reauthorization Act to target 
“the epidemic of violence” against women in Indian country.26  Congress 
enacted Title IX of the VAWA, which specifically applies to Native Ameri-
cans, to “decrease the incidence of violent crimes against Indian women; 
strengthen the capacity of Indian tribes to exercise their sovereign authority 
to respond to violent crimes committed against Indian women; and . . . en-
sure that perpetrators of violent crimes committed against Indian women are 
held accountable for their criminal behavior.”27 
                                                          
 22.  This is particularly alarming because rates of domestic violence among women in gen-
eral, regardless of demographic group, are unacceptably high.  According to the CDC’s National 
Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, approximately “24 people per minute are victims of 
rape, physical violence, or stalking by an intimate partner in the United States.”  S. REP. NO. 112-
153, at 2 (2012).  This statistic reflects intimate partner violence experienced by Americans at 
large, without regard to specific demographic identifiers.  See id. 
 23.  United States v. Kirkaldie, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1102 (D. Mont. 2014), rev’d, No. 14-
30109, 2016 WL 6441060, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2016); Violence Against Women and Depart-
ment of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 901, 119 Stat. 2960, 3077 
(2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 20 & 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter VAWA 
2005]. 
 24.  VAWA 2005 § 901, 119 Stat. at 3077. 
 25.  Id. § 901, 119 Stat. at 3077–78. 
 26.  S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 2 (2012).  President Bush signed the 2005 VAWA Reauthoriza-
tion Act into law on January 5, 2006.  Press Release, Office of Communications, The White 
House, President Signs H.R. 3402, The “Violence Against Women and Department of Justice 
Reauthorization Act of 2005” (Jan. 5, 2006). 
 27.  VAWA 2005 § 902, 119 Stat. at 3078. 
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Several significant provisions of Title IX are outlined below.  Section 
903 of Title IX requires the Attorney General to consult annually with and 
seek recommendations from tribal governments relating to how the pro-
grams and grants established under the VAWA are administered and seek 
recommendations from tribes for future administration of these provi-
sions.28  Section 904 builds upon the Tribal Law and Order Act by extend-
ing jurisdiction to tribal governments over non-Native Americans in a lim-
ited set of circumstances.29  Section 906 amends Part T of Title I of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 by adding grant pro-
visions to Native American tribal governments.30  Section 907 amends Part 
T of Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to 
create a new position, Deputy Director for Tribal Affairs, in the Office of 
Violence Against Women.31 
Of greatest significance to this Comment is Section 909, which 
amends Chapter 7 of Title 18 of the United States Code by adding Section 
117, entitled “Domestic assault by an habitual offender.”32  Section 117 es-
tablishes a separate criminal charge for persons with at least two other do-
mestic violence convictions who commit a subsequent act of domestic vio-
lence in Indian country.33  Since its enactment, some courts have interpreted 
                                                          
 28.  Id. § 903, 119 Stat. at 3078. 
 29.  Id. § 904, 119 Stat. at 3078–79; S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 10–11 (2012).  This provision is 
based on the underlying premise of the Tribal Law and Order Act “that tribal nations with suffi-
cient resources and authority will be best able to address violence in their own communities.”  S. 
REP. NO. 112-153, at 10 (2012).  Note that feminist legal scholarship has recently emphasized ad-
dressing jurisdiction-based problems that arise when non-Native American offenders perpetrate 
domestic violence against Native American persons in Indian Country thus mitigating the effects 
of the Court’s jurisdiction in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.  435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) 
(holding that tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to criminally penalize non-Native American 
offenders); see also, e.g., OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2015 
TRIBAL CONSULTATION REPORT: WORKING TOGETHER TO END THE VIOLENCE 76 (2015) (com-
piling feedback on the newly-implemented Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction pilot 
program to extend limited jurisdiction to some tribes to prosecute certain Native American and 
non-Native American domestic violence offenders); Memorandum from Ronald Weich, supra 
note 5 (suggesting that Congress look for solutions that will empower tribal courts to prosecute 
non-Native American offenders of domestic violence). 
 30.  VAWA 2005 § 906, 119 Stat. at 3078. 
 31.  Id. § 907, 119 Stat. at 3080–82. 
 32.  Id. § 909, 119 Stat. at 3084. 
 33.  Id.  The law specifically provides that:  
Any person who commits a domestic assault within the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States or Indian country and who has a final conviction on at 
least 2 separate prior occasions in Federal, State, or Indian tribal court proceedings [for 
offenses detailed in sub-sections (1) and (2)] shall be fined under this title, imprisoned 
for a term of not more than 5 years, or both, except that if substantial bodily injury re-
sults from a violation under this section, the offender shall be imprisoned for a term of 
not more than 10 years.   
Id. 
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Section 117 as “obligat[ing] the federal Government to hold repeat domes-
tic violence offenders accountable as part of the ‘[f]ederal trust responsibil-
ity to assist tribal governments in safeguarding the lives of Indian wom-
en.’”34  Nevertheless, Section 117’s constitutionality has been challenged 
several times, specifically over the federal government’s authority to try 
Native American defendants based on prior tribal court convictions in 
which the defendant was not represented by counsel, or “uncounseled con-
victions.”35 
B.  United States v. Bryant 
In 2016, one of these constitutional challenges made it to the Supreme 
Court.36  In United States v. Bryant, the defendant, Michael Bryant, was an 
enrolled member of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe who was convicted of 
more than 100 tribal-court convictions, several of which were uncounseled 
domestic violence misdemeanors.37  In 2011, a federal grand jury indicted 
him under Section 117.38  Bryant moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that 
even though his prior tribal court convictions were not themselves unconsti-
tutional, had the convictions occurred in federal or state court, they would 
have violated the Sixth Amendment because he received prison sentences 
but was not appointed counsel.39  As a result, he argued that those convic-
tions could not be used to qualify him as a “habitual offender” under Sec-
                                                          
 34.  United States v. Kirkaldie, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1102 (D. Mont. 2014), rev’d, No. 14-
30109, 2016 WL 6441060, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2016) (quoting VAWA 2005 § 901, 119 Stat. at 
3077). 
 35.  Courts have reached inconsistent results.  Compare United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 
993, 997 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding, inter alia, that the government’s use of Shavanaux’s prior un-
counseled convictions in tribal court did not render his prosecution under Section 117 invalid un-
der the Sixth Amendment), with Kirkaldie, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1109 (concluding that introduction of 
the prosecution’s evidence under Section 117 against Kirkaldie violated his Sixth Amendment 
rights). 
 36.  United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016). 
 37.  Id. at 1963. 
 38.  The first count was based on an incident in February 2011 in which the defendant 
dragged his then-girlfriend off the bed, pulled her hair, and punched and kicked her repeatedly.  
Id.  The second count was based on an incident in May of that same year, in which the defendant 
awoke a different live-in girlfriend by yelling that he could not find the keys to his truck and 
choked her until she almost lost consciousness.  Id.  He admitted that he assaulted this girlfriend 
three times over the course of their two-month relationship.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 1964.  The Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–04 (2012), unlike 
the Sixth Amendment, requires that tribal defendants be appointed counsel only when a prison 
sentence of more than one year is imposed.  25 U.S.C. §§ 1302.  For sentences greater than one 
year, the ICRA guarantees the defendant “‘the right to effective assistance of counsel at least 
equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution,’ including appointment of counsel for 
an indigent defendant at the tribe’s expense.”  Id. § 1302(c)(1), (2).  For sentences less than one 
year, “the tribal court must allow a defendant only the opportunity to obtain counsel ‘at his own 
expense.’”  Id. § 1302(a)(6). 
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tion 117, and that he consequently could not be charged under the statute.  
The United States District Court for the District of Montana disagreed and 
sentenced him to consecutive terms of forty-six months in prison for each 
count.40  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit then re-
versed the district court’s decision and found, based on its opinion in United 
States v. Ant,41 that use of the defendant’s uncounseled tribal court convic-
tions when considering whether Bryant was a habitual offender violated the 
Sixth Amendment.42  This decision created a circuit split between the Ninth 
Circuit and the Eighth and Tenth Circuits over whether the repeat offender 
provision in Section 117 violates the Sixth Amendment because Native 
American defendants in tribal court are not offered the same procedural 
protections as they would receive in federal court.43 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this cir-
cuit split and reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision.44  The Court found that 
because tribal courts are not bound by the Constitution, the procedural safe-
guards contained in the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”)45 were sufficient-
ly similar to those in the Bill of Rights and unanimously upheld Section 117 
as constitutional under both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.46 
In analyzing the Sixth Amendment issue, the Court determined that the 
Sixth Amendment “does not apply to tribal-court proceedings.”47  The 
                                                          
 40.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1964. 
 41.  882 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989) (reversing the lower court’s denial of a motion to 
suppress a guilty plea made in tribal court because the guilty plea would have violated the Sixth 
Amendment in federal court, thereby making it inadmissible in a federal court proceeding). 
 42.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1964. 
 43.  Compare United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 136 S. Ct 
1954 (holding that tribal court convictions used in subsequent prosecutions violate the Sixth 
Amendment where the right to trial in tribal court offers less protection than the Sixth Amendment 
right), with United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding no Sixth 
Amendment violation in using uncounseled tribal court convictions in a Section 117 prosecution, 
even though the tribal court proceedings would have violated the Amendment if they occurred in 
federal court), and United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 997, 1000 (10th Cir. 2011) (con-
cluding that using uncounseled tribal court convictions in a Section 117 prosecution does not vio-
late defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights because tribal prosecutions are not constrained by the 
Bill of Rights). 
 44.  United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 690, 690 (2015) (mem.). 
 45.  25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–04 (2012).  “The ICRA is not co-extensive with the Sixth Amend-
ment.”  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1962. 
 46.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1965.  The Court very briefly addressed Bryant’s Fifth Amendment 
argument, noting that the ICRA requires tribes to “accord[] defendants specific procedural safe-
guards resembling those contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment” and en-
sure “due process of the law.”  Id. at 1966.  The Court determined that proceedings in compliance 
with the ICRA “sufficiently ensure the reliability of tribal-court convictions.”  Id.  On these bases, 
the Court concluded that the use of Bryant’s tribal court convictions did not violate his right to due 
process under the Fifth Amendment.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 1958; see also id. at 1962 (“As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, 
tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed 
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Court then addressed the predicate offense aspect of Section 117 in con-
junction with the Sixth Amendment, the Burgett principle, and the Nichols 
exception.48  Specifically, the Bryant Court noted that following Nichols, 
“enhancement statutes”—laws that increase sentencing for a crime commit-
ted by a repeat offender—do not change the penalty that was imposed for 
the predicate conviction; rather, enhancement statutes punish the defendant 
only for the offense before the trial court.49  The Court thereby concluded 
that the Nichols exception rather than the Burgett principle applied to Bry-
ant’s case.50  The Court reasoned that the Nichols exception indicated that 
using Bryant’s prior, uncounseled tribal court convictions in his prosecution 
under Section 117 did not render his tribal court convictions, which were 
valid under tribal law, invalid under federal law.51  Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that there was “no cause to distinguish for § 117(a) purposes be-
tween valid but uncounseled convictions resulting in a fine and valid but 
uncounseled convictions resulting in imprisonment not exceeding one 
year.”52  The Court justified its holding as remaining consistent with prece-
dent.53 
Justice Thomas drafted a forward-looking concurring opinion, dis-
cussed in depth below, in which he cautioned that much of the congression-
ally enacted law affecting Native Americans is based upon several assump-
tions that lack direct constitutional basis.54  Specifically, Justice Thomas 
critiqued the Court’s development of the tribal sovereignty doctrine over 
                                                          
specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.” (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 
436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978))).  
 48.  Id. at 1962–63.  The Bryant Court first stated the general rule, the “Burgett principle,” 
which holds that “a conviction obtained in violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel cannot be used in a subsequent proceeding ‘either to support guilt or enhance punishment 
for another offense.’”  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1962 (quoting Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 
(1967)).  Then, it addressed a limitation to this general rule, the “Nichols exception,” noting that 
“an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no prison term was imposed, 
is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction.”  Id. at 1965 (quoting 
United States v. Nichols, 511 U.S. 738, 748–49 (1994)). 
 49.  Id. at 1965. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 1966.  Accordingly, the Court found that “Bryant’s 46-month sentence for violating 
§ 117(a) punishes his most recent acts of domestic assault, not his prior crimes prosecuted in tribal 
court.”  Id. at 1965. 
 52.  Id.  The Court thought it “odd to say that a conviction untainted by a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment triggers a violation of that same amendment when it’s used in a subsequent 
case where the defendant’s right to appointed counsel is full and respected.”  Id. (quoting United 
States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014) (Watford, J., concurring), rev’d and remanded, 136 
S. Ct. at 1954)).  
 53.  Id. at 1966 (“In keeping with Nichols, we resist creating a ‘hybrid’ category of tribal-
court convictions, ‘good for the punishment actually imposed but not available for the sentence 
enhancement in a later prosecution.’” (quoting Nichols, 511 U.S. at 744)). 
 54.  Id. at 1967 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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time and questioned whether Congress actually possesses authority, plenary 
or otherwise, over Native American tribes in this regard.55 
C.  The Court’s Sovereignty Doctrine 
The Bryant Court admitted, “[t]he ‘complex patchwork of federal, 
state, and tribal law’ governing Indian country, has made it difficult to stem 
the tide of domestic violence experienced by Native American women.”56  
Notwithstanding this point, the Court barely addressed where Congress’s 
authority to prescribe domestic violence crimes originates.57  The doctrine 
underlying Congress’s purported authority to prescribe this offense, in addi-
tion to Justice Thomas’s commentary on the doctrine in Bryant, are dis-
cussed below. 
1.  Roots of the Supreme Court’s Sovereignty Doctrine 
The Court’s tribal sovereignty doctrine dates back to the early years of 
the Republic, during which the Marshall Court issued three pivotal opin-
ions: Johnson v. M’Intosh,58 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,59 and Worcester 
v. Georgia.60  These three cases are collectively referred to as “the Marshall 
Trilogy.” 
M’Intosh is perhaps the most significant of all of the cases.  Address-
ing the issue of whether individuals could purchase land from Native Amer-
icans,61 the Court held that no such transactions could occur because Native 
Americans were incapable of possessing title.62  In arriving at this conclu-
sion, the Court embraced a sovereignty-through-conquest theory63 through 
                                                          
 55.  Id. at 1968. 
 56.  Id. at 1959–60 (majority opinion) (quoting Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 689 n.1 (1990)). 
 57.  The Court’s reliance on Ex Parte Crow Dog does little, if anything, to explain the basis 
for congressional authority in this regard.  See id. at 1960–61 (“Although federal law generally 
governs Indian country, Congress has long excluded from federal-court jurisdiction crimes com-
mitted by an Indian against another Indian.” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1152; Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 
U.S. 556, 572 (1883))).  The Court’s citation to Santa Clara Pueblo similarly fails to explain the 
source of Congress’s authority.  Id. at 1962 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 
56 (1978)); see also supra note 21 (noting that the Bryant Court dedicated only one paragraph to 
discussing the roots of the tribal sovereignty doctrine). 
 58.  21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 59.  30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
 60.  31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 61.  M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 563 (“[T]he only question in this case must be, whether it 
be competent to individuals to make such purchases [of Native American land], or whether that be 
the exclusive prerogative of government.”). 
 62.  Id. at 591. 
 63.  The sovereignty-through-conquest theory provides, “[c]onquest gives a title to which the 
Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals 
may be, respecting the original justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted.”  Id. at 
588. 
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its adoption of the discovery rule.64  Under the discovery rule, the rights of 
Native Americans who lived in a country prior to its discovery by English-
men or others “were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were neces-
sarily, to a considerable extent, impaired.”65  A necessary premise under-
pinning this conclusion was the assumed inferiority of Native Americans: 
“the Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be pro-
tected, indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their lands, but to be 
deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title of others.”66  Conse-
quently, however, the Court articulated the foundations for a tribal sover-
eignty doctrine. 
Subsequently, in Cherokee Nation, the Court held that it did not have 
jurisdiction over claims involving a tribal nation within the territorial 
boundaries of the United States.67  The Court noted that, as early as 1831, 
the sovereignty relationship between the United States and tribal nations 
was complex: “[t]he condition of the Indians in relation to the United 
States, is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence.”68  The 
Court additionally held that Native American tribes were neither foreign na-
tions nor domestic states but, instead, were more likely “denominated do-
mestic dependent nations.”69  The Court explained that as denominated do-
mestic dependent nations,70 Native American tribes “are considered by 
foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so completely under the 
sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that any attempt to acquire 
their lands, or to form a political connexion [sic] with them, would be con-
sidered as an invasion of our territory and an act of hostility.”71  M’Intosh 
and Cherokee Nation, taken together, suggest that the Court began to adopt 
a view of tribal sovereignty that emphasized the power of the federal gov-
                                                          
 64.  Id. at 573 (“[D]iscovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose au-
thority, it was made, against all other European governments, which title might be consummated 
by possession.”). 
 65.  Id. at 574. 
 66.  Id. at 591.  In discussing this idea of inferiority, the Court highlighted that, “the tribes of 
Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose sub-
sistence was drawn chiefly from the forest.  To leave them in possession of their country, was to 
leave the country a wilderness.”  Id.  
 67.  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 80 (1831).  Note that over time, the 
strength of this holding eroded, and the Court now reviews such cases.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016) (reviewing the constitutionality of a tribal court sentence by a Na-
tive American tribe within the territorial boundaries of the United States). 
 68.  Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16. 
 69.  Id. at 17. 
 70.  Id.  The Cherokee Nation Court addressed Native American sovereignty with a similar 
tone to that of the M’Intosh Court.  See id. at 15 (“A people once numerous, powerful, and truly 
independent, found by our ancestors in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of an ample domain, 
gradually sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts and our arms . . . .”). 
 71.  Id. at 17–18. 
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ernment to interact with Native American tribes in any manner they wished, 
subject to virtually no limitations. 
In 1832, the Marshall Court elaborated once again on its sovereignty 
principles, but in a slightly different manner.72  The Court’s opinion in 
Worcester effectively minimized the authority that the states had over Na-
tive American tribes by drawing a distinction between federal and state 
powers.73  Interestingly, the Court also highlighted the independent charac-
ter of Native American tribes in a manner that arguably suggested that the 
tribes, though governed by the federal government, still enjoyed some 
measure of sovereignty: 
 From the commencement of our government, congress has 
passed acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; 
which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a 
firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate.  All 
these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, 
manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political 
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their au-
thority is exclusive, and having a right to all lands within those 
boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by 
the United States.74 
The Marshall Court’s position on sovereignty, therefore, centers on the 
propositions that (1) Native Americans are inferior to those of European an-
cestry and enjoy minimal rights,75 (2) the federal government, rather than 
state governments, is largely responsible for interactions with Native Amer-
icans,76 and (3) while Native American tribes are not foreign nations,77 they 
constitute somewhat independent entities from the United States despite 
their perceived inferiority.78 
Fifty-three years after Worcester, the Court issued another significant 
sovereignty opinion in United States v. Kagama,79 once again acknowledg-
ing the complexity of tribal sovereignty doctrine.80  The Kagama Court not-
                                                          
 72.  Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 73.  See id. at 557 (“The treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territo-
ry as completely separated from that of the states; and provide that all intercourse with them shall 
be carried on exclusively by the government of the union.”). 
 74.  Id. at 556–57. 
 75.  Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 605 (1823). 
 76.  Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 515, 596. 
 77.  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
 78.  Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 519. 
 79.  118 U.S. 375, 385–86 (1886) (holding that the federal law regulating murder on Native 
American reservations as criminal did not violate sovereignty). 
 80.  Id. at 381 (“The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United 
States, both before and since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been 
an anomalous one, and of a complex character.”). 
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ed, the “Constitution of the United States is almost silent in regard to the 
relations of the government which was established by it to the numerous 
tribes of Indians within its borders.”81  Further, it determined that the refer-
ences to “Indians” in the taxation provision of the Fourteenth Amendment82 
and the Commerce Clause83 were not explicit enough to confer federal 
power over non-economic interactions with Native American tribes.84  In-
stead, the Court held that this power is found “from the ownership of the 
country in which the Territories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty 
which must exist in the National Government, and can be found nowhere 
else.”85  The Court then rejected the arguments of the Native American de-
fendants and determined that Native Americans are wards of the govern-
ment.86 As a result of this wardship relationship, the Court found that the 
federal government assumes both a duty to protect the tribes as well as ple-
nary power over them.87 
2.  Justice Thomas’s Concurrence in Bryant 
Justice Thomas offered two views of sovereignty in his concurrence in 
the Bryant decision.  First, Justice Thomas briefly discussed the theory that 
tribes have “core sovereignty.”88  He suggested that under this view of sov-
ereignty, because Native American tribes are “separate sovereigns pre-
existing the Constitution,” criminal prosecutions by tribes are not circum-
scribed by the restrictions imposed on the state and federal governments by 
the U.S. Constitution.89 
Second, Justice Thomas addressed the proposition that Congress has 
an “‘all-encompassing’ [plenary] power over all aspects of tribal sovereign-
ty.”90  Under such a view, Congress has a duty to make certain that repeat 
                                                          
 81.  Id. at 378. 
 82.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed.”). 
 83.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”). 
 84.  Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378. 
 85.  Id. at 380. 
 86.  See id. at 384.  The Court declared: 
From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of 
the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there 
arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.  This has always been recognized 
by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen. 
Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1967 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 89.  Id. (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978)). 
 90.  Id. at 1968 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 45 U.S. 313, 319 (1978)). 
 860 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:848 
 
offenders of domestic violence in Indian country are sufficiently punished 
in order to protect victims of domestic violence.91  This view appears to 
stem from a single quote in Kagama: “The power of the General Govern-
ment over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and dimin-
ished in numbers, is necessary to their protection. . . .  It must exist in that 
government, because it has never existed anywhere else.”92  Justice Thomas 
disapproved of this view of sovereignty and argued that no single enumer-
ated power in the Constitution bestows Congress with “such sweeping au-
thority.”93  Justice Thomas also suggested that the Court created this sweep-
ing power because it could not find an enumerated power that would justify 
punishing crimes committed by Native Americans in Indian country.94  
Given that the Bryant Court did not question this “paternalistic”95 and 
seemingly outdated view of tribal sovereignty, Justice Thomas cautioned 
that “[u]ntil the Court ceases treating all Indian tribes as an undifferentiated 
mass, our case law will remain bedeviled by amorphous and ahistorical as-
sumptions about the scope of tribal sovereignty.”96 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion opens up a broader conversation 
about sovereignty, which draws on a concentrated body of scholarly work.  
This Part will evaluate various widely recognized conceptions of tribal sov-
ereignty with respect to traditional police powers of the state.97  This Part 
then argues, regarding Section 117, that any appropriate conception of sov-
ereignty must respect the authority of tribal governments to address domes-
tic violence in their own communities.98  This Part concludes by proposing 
that a renewable jurisdictional waiver provision could bring Section 117 
within this theory of tribal sovereignty.99 
                                                          
 91.  Id.  Justice Thomas further argued, “[t]hus, even though tribal prosecutions of tribal 
members are purportedly the apex of tribal sovereignty, Congress can second-guess how tribes 
prosecute domestic abuse perpetrated by Indians against other Indians on Indian land by virtue of 
its ‘plenary power’ over Indian tribes.”  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 1968 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886)). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 1969. 
 96.  Id. at 1968. 
 97.  See infra Part II.B. 
 98.  See infra Part II.C. 
 99.  See infra Part II.D. 
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A.  Introduction to the Sovereignty Debate in the Domestic Violence 
Context 
Understanding the modern Native American sovereignty debate re-
quires first understanding that Native Americans are United States citi-
zens.100  This is important to note at the outset because when the Supreme 
Court initially began to address issues of Native American sovereignty, Na-
tive Americans were not considered U.S. citizens.101  As a result, the Court 
may have felt less obligated to account for their interests.102  Presently, 
however, the Court recognizes that tribal powers include taxing “transac-
tions occurring on Indian land,”103 punishing members of their respective 
tribe for violations of tribal law,104 and “govern[ing] themselves.”105  Tribes 
still may not, however, “establish their own international commercial and 
foreign affairs policies”106 or, with some exceptions, “try non-Indians in 
tribal courts.”107  Despite these relatively settled principles, there still ap-
pears to be a great deal of confusion and lack of consistent interpretation of 
Native American sovereignty among Justices on the Supreme Court.108 
The federal judiciary presently views Native American tribes as “en-
joying some measure of sovereignty.”109  Nevertheless, the Court has de-
ferred to congressional determinations about the extent to which tribal sov-
ereignty is to be respected.110  The judiciary additionally appears to 
                                                          
 100.  In 1924, Congress conferred citizenship on all “non-citizen Indians born within the terri-
torial limits of the United States.”  An Act To Authorize the Secretary of the Interior to Issue Cer-
tificates of Citizenship to Indians, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (1924). 
 101.  See id. (noting that Native Americans born within the territorial limits of the United 
States were not automatically given citizenship until 1924). 
 102.  See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831) (“The condition of 
the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in exist-
ence.  In the general, nations not owing a common allegiance are foreign to each other.  The term 
foreign nation is, with strict propriety, applicable by either to the other.”). 
 103.  Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1075–76 
(2004). 
 104.  Id. at 1076. 
 105.  Id.  
 106.  Id. at 1075. 
 107.  Id.  An example of such an exception is contained in the Violence Against Women Act of 
2013, which allows tribes to try any perpetrator for domestic violence against Native Americans 
that was committed in Indian country.  Violence Against Women Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 
§ 904 127 Stat. 54, 120–24 (2013). 
 108.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 109.  Prakash, supra note 103, at 1075. 
 110.  See Elizabeth Burleson, Tribal, State, and Federal Cooperation to Achieve Good Gov-
ernance, 40 AKRON L. REV. 207, 210 (2007) (noting that in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 
(2004), the Court deferred to “Congress’[s] authority to determine the extent of inherent sovereign 
power of Indian tribes under federal law” (quoting Philip Burnham, Reading the Supreme Court, 
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Jan. 11 2005), http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id= 
1096410130). 
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subscribe to the argument that the federal government, as opposed to the 
states, has plenary power over Native American tribes, and Congress specif-
ically has authority to “limit, modify, or eliminate any aspect of tribal gov-
ernance or tribal law.”111 
Because tribal affairs often involve issues that fall within the tradition-
al police powers of the states, the federal government may be ill-equipped 
to address these problems.112  Nevertheless, the judiciary’s tribal sovereign-
ty doctrine has the practical effect of extending extreme deference to Con-
gress’s policy determinations and expanding federal authority over the areas 
traditionally left to the states.113  The expansion of authority has resulted in 
a number of problems in addition to those addressed by Justice Thomas.114  
This Comment focuses on one of these problems, the “patchwork of laws 
affecting Indian country,” which has resulted in a jurisdictional gap in 
which the federal government and tribal governments are unsure as to who 
should address various problems that arise.115  This jurisdictional gap has 
proven to be particularly problematic in addressing domestic violence.116 
For example, prior to the enactment of the most recent VAWA, feder-
al, state, and tribal law enforcement officials often did not know whether 
they had the authority to respond to reports of domestic violence.  Upon re-
ceiving a report of domestic violence, federal agents generally first asked if 
the incident occurred in Indian country.117  If it did, the federal officers of-
ten left the scene, claiming that they lacked authority to address the situa-
                                                          
 111.  Prakash, supra note 103, at 1076. 
 112.  See infra Part II.C. 
 113.  See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1967 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Con-
gress ordinarily lacks authority to enact a general federal criminal law proscribing domestic abuse.  
But, the Court suggests, Congress must intervene on reservations to ensure that prolific domestic 
abusers receive sufficient punishment.” (citations omitted) (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 610–13 (2000))). 
 114.  See Burleson, supra note 110, at 219, 229 (discussing how expansion of federal authority 
has resulted in problems relating to civil jurisdiction over non-Native Americans, water rights, 
staggeringly high rates of drug addiction within tribal communities, in addition to domestic vio-
lence). 
 115.  Rebecca A. Hart & M. Alexander Lowther, Honoring Sovereignty: Aiding Tribal Efforts 
to Protect Native Women from Domestic Violence, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 185, 203 (2008). 
 116.  See Beth Azar, When Tribal Law Conflicts with Federal Law, AM. PSYHOL. ASS’N (April 
2011), http://www.apa.org/monitor/2011/04/tribal-law.aspx (“Crime and health problems in Indi-
an Country stem from a complex combination of an unclear chain of authority, underfunding and 
misplaced priorities that have resulted from decades of marginalization and trauma.”); Jeana Petil-
lo, Note, Domestic Violence in Indian Country: Improving the Federal Government’s Response to 
this Grave Epidemic, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1841, 1843 (2013) (“The complex scheme of criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian country, created by the federal government, significantly impedes law en-
forcement’s ability to respond to domestic violence.”). 
 117.  Petillo, supra note 116, at 1856. 
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tion.118  Tribal officials responding to such calls acted similarly due to con-
fusion about their authority resulting from jurisdictional gap.119   
This problem extends beyond uncertainty over who responds to do-
mestic violence calls.  It also implicates prosecutions of domestic violence 
offenses.  For instance, many tribes have shied away from prosecuting do-
mestic violence offenses because of a mistaken belief that they lack juris-
diction or that the federal government is already working on the case.120  
Further, it is not uncommon for the federal government to fail to inform 
tribal governments about their decisions to prosecute the cases in which 
they share concurrent jurisdiction with the tribes.121  This jurisdictional gap 
may be due, at least in part, to the inflexible adversarialism of the Anglo-
American legal tradition and the unwillingness of the federal government to 
incorporate non-western tribal customs in addressing domestic violence.122 
The federal government’s arguably unresolved relationship with tribal 
governments, which inherently differs from its relationship with the 
states,123 could further contribute to the persistence of these problems.  Na-
tive American tribes, themselves, have suggested that the nature of their re-
lationships to the federal government interferes with their ability to obtain 
government assistance in addressing domestic violence in a manner not ex-
perienced by the states.124  Reconciling the Court’s tribal sovereignty doc-
trine with these issues is therefore paramount to combating the domestic vi-
olence epidemic in Native American communities. 
                                                          
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 1851–52. 
 121.  See id. at 1856 (“In some cases, the federal authorities do not inform tribes that they have 
decided not to prosecute a case until after the tribe’s statute of limitations has run out.  In other 
cases, the federal authorities never tell the tribe that they have declined to prosecute a case.” 
(footnote omitted) (citing Timothy Williams, High Crime but Fewer Prosecutions on Indian Land, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2012, at A14)). 
 122.  Hart & Lowther, supra note 115, at 196 (“Tribal conceptions of sovereignty differed sig-
nificantly from the Western perspective espoused by early U.S. Supreme Court cases which codi-
fied the systematic categorization of tribal sovereignty as both inferior and easily disregarded by 
other branches.”); Marie Quasius, Note, Native American Rape Victims: Desperately Seeking an 
Oliphant-Fix, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1902, 1919 (2009) (“Anglo-American courts differ from tribal 
courts in that the Anglo-American system focuses on individual rights in an adversarial system 
and resolves criminal disputes through punishment and removal of the offender from the commu-
nity.”). 
 123.  Professor Prakash notes that “[u]nlike cities and counties, tribes are not the subunits of 
another sovereign.”  Prakash, supra note 103, at 1076. 
 124.  Raymond Buelna, a tribal councilman of the Pascua Yaqui, told the federal government 
in an annual consultation with other tribes that “[t]ribes need permanent funding and access to 
resources and services that are available to state, county, and municipal governments.”  OFFICE ON 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 29, at 10.  Additionally, Lenora Hootch, Tribal Coun-
cilmember of the Nature Village of Emmonak and Executive Director of the Yup’ik Women’s 
Coalition, suggests that if tribes were treated like states, rather than the way they are now, their 
funding problems could be resolved.  Id. at 35.  
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B.  Theories of Sovereignty 
1.  The Founders and the Supreme Court 
Though courts and scholars have struggled to determine how the 
Founders viewed tribal sovereignty, history reveals that they “regarded In-
dians as distinct nations to be dealt with diplomatically and at arm’s 
length.”125  The Supreme Court, by contrast, has had ample opportunity to 
articulate its position on Native American sovereignty.  Though the Court’s 
jurisprudence on this subject remains somewhat unresolved, it has neverthe-
less consistently accepted the premise that the federal government is su-
preme over tribal governments.126 
a.  The Treaty Power and Sovereignty 
The Court has acknowledged that treaties between the federal govern-
ment and Native American tribes established the standards for their interac-
tions for a significant portion of U.S. history.127  This method of governing 
Native American tribes, as authorized through the Article II treaty power,128 
has been notably critiqued by Justice Thomas.  In his concurrence in United 
States v. Lara,129 Justice Thomas argued, “[t]he treaty power does not, as 
the Court seems to believe, provide Congress with free-floating power to 
legislate as it sees fit on topics that could potentially implicate some un-
specified treaty.”130  Justice Thomas further argued that the majority’s sug-
gestion that a broad power to legislate Native American tribes exists 
through the treaty power “is especially ironic in light of Congress’ enacted 
prohibition on Indian treaties.”131 
                                                          
 125.  Prakash, supra note 103, at 1080. 
 126.  See id. at 1076 (“However confusing or contradictory it may be in other respects, federal 
Indian law is quite clear about the federal government’s complete supremacy.”). 
 127.  United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004).  While the government no longer uses 
treaties as a vehicle for governing Native American tribes as it did in the earlier years of the re-
public, scholars argue that while these treaties were in effect, a trust relationship between the fed-
eral government and the Native American tribes emerged.  Petillo, supra note 116, at 1846.  Pur-
suant to this trust relationship, which is sometimes referred to as the “doctrine of trust 
responsibility,” the “federal government would respect the tribes’ independence, protect the tribes, 
and provide supplies and services to the tribes” in exchange for large parcels of Native American 
land in the 1700s and early 1800s.  Id. 
 128.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.  The treaty power states that the President “shall have Power, by 
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Sena-
tors present concur.”  Id. 
 129.  541 U.S. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 130.  Id. at 225. 
 131.  Id. 
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b.  Plenary Power and Sovereignty 
Though the Court never overturned its earlier conclusion that the Arti-
cle II treaty power no longer empowers the federal government to regulate 
Native American affairs, it is more likely to rely on other Constitutional 
provisions and doctrines to decide tribal sovereignty cases.  For example, 
the Court would be more likely to find that Congress possesses plenary 
power over Native American tribes through the Commerce Clause and by 
relying on constitutional history.132 
i.  Plenary Power Through Conquest and Wardship 
The Court has principally relied on two theories of Native American 
sovereignty when interpreting common law and historical traditions to con-
fer upon Congress plenary power over Native American tribes: the conquest 
theory and the wardship theory.133  The Marshall trilogy134 established the 
foundation for the conquest theory.135  In these cases, “the Supreme Court 
incorporated the international colonial doctrine of discovery into United 
States law, divested tribes of foreign nation status, and recognized that 
States have no power over Native American affairs.”136  M’Intosh was the 
first case in which the Court articulated this conquest theory.137  The Court 
found that Europeans had a right to take title to the land in the United States 
upon arrival, “notwithstanding the occupancy of the natives, who were hea-
thens,”138 because Native Americans were incapable of possessing land in 
fee simple and therefore only had a present right to occupancy.139  In 
Worcester, the Court summarized the conquest theory, previously articulat-
ed in M’Intosh, explaining, “power, war, conquest, give rights, which, after 
possession, are conceded by the world; and which can never be controvert-
ed by those on whom they descend.”140  Relatedly, in Cherokee Nation, the 
Court determined that Native American tribes were “domestic dependent 
                                                          
 132.  See id. (arguing that the treaty should not be the basis for establishing plenary power over 
the tribes because it “is especially ironic in light of Congress’ enacted prohibition on Indian trea-
ties.”); see also Prakash, supra note 103, at 1070–71 (“Irrespective of a particular tribe’s treaties 
with the United States or its pattern of land ownership, the Court has declared that the federal 
government enjoys a ‘plenary power’ over all Indian tribes.”). 
 133.  Prakash, supra note 103 at 1078, 1106. 
 134.  As previously noted, the “Marshall Trilogy” refers to Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 
Wheat.) 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 135.  Prakash, supra note 103, at 1072.  The Court has also referred to this conquest theory as 
the “discovery” rule.  M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574. 
 136.  Burleson, supra note 110, at 209. 
 137.  M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573. 
 138.  Id. at 576–77. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543 (1832). 
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nations,”141 thereby “enable[ing] Congress to lower Native Americans af-
fairs from the sphere of international law to domestic law.”142 
Following its adoption of the conquest theory, the Court began to for-
mulate the related “wardship theory,” which was also premised on the infe-
riority of Native Americans.143  Indeed, in Kagama, the Court for the first 
time “definitively asserted” a federal plenary power over Native American 
tribes based on a this theory.144  Namely, the Kagama Court viewed Native 
Americans as “wards of the nation.”145  Based on this view, the Court held, 
“[t]he power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once 
powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their pro-
tection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell.”146 
Among the many critics of the Court’s conquest and wardship theo-
ries, and perhaps the most salient and insightful critic of them all is Profes-
sor Saikrishna Prakash.147  Professor Prakash suggests that both theories, 
and the wardship theory in particular, are problematic because “there is no 
determinate means of judging whether a nation is weak and helpless.”148  
Perhaps in light of this critique, while courts continue to cite to Kagama in 
support of the proposition that the federal government has plenary power 
over Native American tribes, “the Court in recent times has retreated from 
the assertion that Indian dependency authorizes plenary power.”149 
ii.  Plenary Power Through the Commerce Clause 
Courts slowly began to abandon the conquest and wardship theories of 
Native American tribal sovereignty in favor of the idea that Congress’s ple-
                                                          
 141.  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
 142.  Burleson, supra note 110, at 209 n.8. 
 143.  Prakash, supra note 103, at 1077.  Prakash argues that the Court’s wardship theory was 
formed “not by virtue of anything in the Constitution’s text, but because of tribal ‘weakness and 
helplessness.’”  Id. at 1078 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886)). 
 144.  Id. at 1077.  The Kagama Court, however, was not the first to find that a wardship rela-
tionship existed between the federal government and Native American tribes, but it was the first to 
base its position of tribal sovereignty on the relationship.  Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384 (determining 
that federal power over Native American tribes is necessary to ensure their protection as a “race 
once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers”).  The Court in Cherokee Nation had pre-
viously described the relationship between the federal government and Native Americans as “re-
sembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian” and noted that Native Americans “look to our govern-
ment for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and 
address the president as their great father.”  Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. 
 145.  Kagama, 118 U.S. at 382. 
 146.  Id. at 384. 
 147.  Prakash, supra note 103, at 1069. 
 148.  Id. at 1103. 
 149.  Id. at 1078–79.  Indeed, Professor Prakash argues that the Court’s retreat could be due to 
potential embarrassment “by the nontextual foundations of the wardship theory” and the “pater-
nalistic flavor” of Kagama.  Id.  
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nary power over Native American tribes stems from the Commerce 
Clause.150  For example, in United States v. Cavanaugh,151 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that “Congress, however, en-
joys broad power to regulate tribal affairs and limit or expand tribal sover-
eignty through the Indian Commerce Clause.”152  The Supreme Court has 
even asserted, “the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to 
provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian af-
fairs.”153 
Similar to its other doctrines that favor limiting tribal sovereignty,154 
the Court’s conclusion that Congress enjoys plenary power over Native 
American tribes pursuant to the Commerce Clause has its critics.155  Even 
the Kagama Court was critical of this argument, noting that the provisions 
of the criminal statute at issue, which do not relate to commerce in any way, 
would not fall under Congress’s commerce power without drastically tortur-
ing the Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause.156 
The Court’s justifications for its view that Congress enjoys plenary 
power over Native Americans are founded upon outdated notions of Native 
American inferiority, principles that lack constitutional support, or a com-
bination thereof.  This suggests that the Court should re-examine the gov-
ernment’s source of power over Native American tribes in order to reach an 
acceptable articulation of its tribal sovereignty doctrine.157  As demonstrat-
ed above, the Court’s theory of tribal sovereignty leaves much to be de-
sired. 
2.  A New Framework for Tribal Sovereignty 
Professor Prakash authored a well-regarded law review piece, Against 
Tribal Fungibility, critiquing the Supreme Court’s tribal sovereignty juris-
prudence and proposing a new framework for analyzing sovereignty ques-
tions.158  Indeed, Justice Thomas even cited to and advanced Professor Pra-
                                                          
 150.  E.g., McLanahan v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973) (“The source of 
federal authority over Indian matters has been the subject of some confusion, but it is now gener-
ally recognized that the power derives from federal responsibility for regulating commerce with 
Indian tribes and for treaty making.”). 
 151.  643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 152.  Id. at 595. 
 153.  Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). 
 154.  See supra Parts II.B.1.a, II.B.1.b.i.  
 155.  See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 103, at 1079 (“Although these pronouncements at least are 
tied to the Constitution’s text, the Court has never explained how seemingly modest grants of au-
thority might ever grant plenary authority over all Indian tribes.  Indeed, in its latest foray into this 
area, the Court blithely repeated these claims without pausing to make sense of them.”). 
 156.  United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1886). 
 157.  See discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
 158.  See generally Prakash, supra note 103. 
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kash’s theory in his Bryant concurrence.159  In his article, Professor Prakash 
casts the relationship between Native American tribes and the federal gov-
ernment in a novel light: 
 We should not regard all tribes as the sovereign wards of the 
federal government because the Constitution, by itself, does not 
enshrine the federal government as their all-powerful constitu-
tional guardian.  At the same time, we should not regard every 
Indian nation as completely independent of the United States, as 
if they were all equals of France or Germany.  The Constitution 
allows for far more variety and complexity where America’s rela-
tions to the domestic dependent nations are concerned.160 
Professor Prakash’s theory on tribal sovereignty contains two signifi-
cant propositions.  First, Professor Prakash argues that because tribes are 
not identical entities, the federal government’s authority over tribal activity 
should be addressed on a “tribe-by-tribe basis.”161  Second, Professor Pra-
kash advocates a treaty-like framework for federal authority over tribal af-
fairs.162 
Professor Prakash’s approach appears to suggest that a federal plenary 
power over Native American tribes is not inherently offensive to tribal sov-
ereignty, so long as the tribe has explicitly authorized it.163  Although Pro-
fessor Prakash’s approach is more respectful of tribal sovereignty than the 
positions articulated by the Court, it faces a significant obstacle to imple-
mentation because the government no longer enters into “treaties” with Na-
tive American tribes.164  Despite this obstacle, Professor Prakash’s frame-
work nevertheless provides a helpful starting point for re-framing how 
sovereignty should be addressed in the courts. 
                                                          
 159.  United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1968 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 
Prakash, supra note 103, at 1070–74, 1107–10). 
 160.  Prakash, supra note 103, at 1074. 
 161.  Id. at 1073. 
 162.  Id. at 1111.  Specifically, Professor Prakash suggests that “a treaty could clearly provide 
that the U.S. government could exercise plenary (or some lesser) power . . . .  And when a treaty’s 
best reading indicates that the United States may exercise plenary power over an Indian tribe, the 
federal government has secured the power to regulate all aspects of that tribe.”  Id. at 1111–12 
(footnote omitted). 
 163.  Id. at 1118 (“Rejection of across-the-board plenary power does not mean that the federal 
government cannot acquire a broad power over those tribes that see some wisdom in plenary fed-
eral power.”). 
 164.  As of 1871, Congress forbids the federal government from entering into treaties with Na-
tive Americans.  See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012). 
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C.  Sovereignty Considerations for Evaluating Federal Domestic 
Violence Measures 
As Professor Prakash suggests, the impact on tribal sovereignty of a 
law that regulates tribal activity is an important factor that should be con-
sidered by lawmakers, but is often glossed over by the Court.165  A paradox 
logically arises when applying this consideration to the domestic violence 
context: “tribes seek to reinforce their sovereignty and yet must rely on 
Congress to buttress the very sovereignty they wish to assert.”166  Given this 
paradox, a very fine balance must be struck; a new theory of sovereignty 
must maximize the efficacy of domestic violence regulations while still re-
specting tribal sovereignty.  To achieve this balance, courts and legislatures 
reviewing and creating these regulations should consider (1) whether the 
policymakers themselves have addressed tribal sovereignty in drafting the 
law at issue, (2) whether the law would foster cooperation between the fed-
eral and tribal governments, and (3) whether the law acknowledges the im-
portance of tribal control over domestic violence solutions. 
First, whether the policymakers considered the impact on tribal sover-
eignty in their deliberations is suggestive of the degree of respect that a giv-
en law has for tribal sovereignty.167  For instance, a legislative body’s fail-
ure to note a law’s impact on tribal sovereignty may indicate that problems 
implicating a tribe’s sovereignty could later arise. 
Second, laws and judicial opinions that address the need for coopera-
tion between the federal government and tribal governments regarding con-
current jurisdiction over domestic violence are more likely to promote tribal 
sovereignty.168  Domestic violence in Indian country is an issue that both 
tribal governments and the federal government have an interest in resolv-
ing.169  The federal government has an interest in protecting Native Ameri-
cans, who are U.S. citizens, from domestic violence just as they have an in-
                                                          
 165.  Cf. supra Prakash, supra note 103, at 1120 (proposing that the proper way to determine 
the extent of federal power on a given tribal issue is to take the specific circumstances of each 
tribe into account and “[o]nly then will America’s sovereign wards truly come of age”). 
 166.  Hart & Lowther, supra note 115, at 225. 
 167.  See generally United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1967 (2016) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting that Congress’s current approach to evaluating sovereignty is outdated but is 
nevertheless an important question in addressing federal-tribal relationships). 
 168.  Hart & Lowther, supra note 115, at 225 (“Given the current relationship between tribes 
and the federal government, it is unlikely that bona fide solutions for Native American women 
exist that will not implicate the cooperation between both sovereigns.”). 
 169.  Daniel Coriz, a Tribal Official of Kewa Pueblo, described this shared goal when address-
ing the federal government: “we are here today because we share common goals: to restore peace 
in our tribal communities, to ensure the safety of Native women and children, and to support of-
fender accountability.”  OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 29, at 19. 
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terest in protecting any other U.S. citizen from domestic violence.170  The 
government’s interest is furthered by the fact that tribes are not equipped 
with sufficient resources to address domestic violence in their communities 
without assistance.171  Still, the federal government’s authority over the 
tribes must have a limit.172  Coordination is necessary to balance tribal sov-
ereignty with the federal government’s interest in taking action, because as 
the U.S. Department of Justice notes, “[i]f the state and tribes are going to 
work together, we have to come together in a good way where all opinions 
are valued and respected.”173 
Third, domestic violence measures that acknowledge the need for trib-
al control over the issue are more likely to preserve tribal sovereignty.174  
Because the tribes are best positioned to understand what is needed to ad-
dress domestic violence in their communities, if they are given sufficient 
control, they can make sure the resources allotted and measures enacted are 
                                                          
 170.  The federal government’s interest in protecting Native Americans from domestic vio-
lence is particularly strong, given that Native Americans have been regarded by the international 
human rights community as needing special protection.  See Burleson, supra note 110, at 239 
(“International human rights based claims have provided indigenous communities the greatest pro-
tection to date.”).  Tribal leaders have discussed the federal government’s strong interest in pro-
tecting Native Americans from domestic violence as well given their status as U.S. citizens.  See 
OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 29, at 26 (testimony of Bonnie Juneau, 
Tulalip Board Member) (“The government has a greater responsibility to tribes because we are 
dual citizens.  We are citizens of our tribes, and we are citizens of the United States.  Therefore, 
the U.S. government has double the responsibility.”).  
 171.  See Petillo, supra note 116, at 1849–50 (“Due to the lack of infrastructure in many parts 
of Indian country, many incidents of domestic violence are likely unreported or undocumented 
because, for example, victims are unable to obtain assistance from the police or are unable to get a 
medical provider.” (footnote omitted) (citing Kathy Dobie, Tiny Little Laws: A Plague of Sexual 
Violence in Indian Country, HARPER’S MAG., Feb. 2011, at 59)); see also OFFICE ON VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 29, at 14 (“Many small tribes do not have the infrastructure or gen-
eral funds to carry a [victim services] program without additional state or federal dollars.”). 
 172.  See Prakash, supra note 103, at 1116–17 (“While the conferral of citizenship [to Native 
Americans] might have enhanced federal power, it did not and could not yield a plenary power 
over the new citizens.  After all, the federal government does not have plenary power over all U.S. 
citizens.  Indeed, U.S. citizenship is neither necessary nor sufficient for the exercise of plenary 
federal power over some individual or group.” (footnote omitted)); Petillo, supra note 116, at 
1864–65 (“By preventing tribes from addressing some crimes in Indian country through tribal law 
enforcement and the tribal court system, the federal government ‘robs the tribal community of 
leadership in one of the most important areas of governance: maintenance of public safety and 
criminal justice.’” (quoting Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 709, 738 (2006))). 
 173.  OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 29, at 13; see also Burleson, supra 
note 110, at 252–53 (“Transparent, legitimate, and accountable governments are the most likely to 
be able to achieve good governance and cooperate with one another in international decision-
making forums.”). 
 174.  See Hart & Lowther, supra note 115, at 192 (“Tribal remedies not only bolster the sover-
eignty of tribes, but they aid Native American women in reclaiming self-determination over their 
bodies.”). 
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functioning appropriately.175  Indeed, as former Assistant Attorney General 
Reich noted, “[t]ribal governments, police, prosecutors, and courts—should 
be essential parts of the response to these crimes.”176 
Tribal leaders consistently advocate the need for greater control over 
domestic violence cases involving their members.177  Julie and Nikki Fink-
bonner of the Lummi Nation explained to the federal government at the 
2015 annual consultation why tribal control is needed: “when we do receive 
DOJ funding, trust that we are going to find the right way to accomplish 
what we put in our proposal.  Do not tell us, ‘This is inappropriate,’ or ‘You 
can’t use the dollars for this or that.’  We know what works for our peo-
ple.”178 
Scholars and advocates stress that respect for tribal customs and juris-
diction as well as “culturally-appropriate law enforcement” are key to the 
efficacy of federal policies addressing domestic violence.179  Accordingly, 
analyses of federal domestic violence laws that evaluate whether the law-
makers considered issues of tribal sovereignty when drafting the domestic 
violence measures, whether such measures acknowledge the need for coop-
eration between federal and tribal governments, and whether those 
measures empower tribal control over the issue, are most likely to ensure 
that these laws are both effective and respectful of tribal sovereignty. 
D.  Applying Sovereignty Considerations to Section 117 
Applying the foregoing analysis, Section 117, as it currently stands, 
does not sufficiently respect tribal sovereignty.  First, Section 117 under-
mines tribal decisions regarding penalties for Native American offenders.  
Second, it does not appear that all tribes subject to the law consented to its 
enactment.  Extending the logic of Professor Prakash’s treaty-based theory 
to traditional police powers of the state and, more specifically, to federal 
and tribal efforts to reduce domestic violence, provides an appropriate way 
of incorporating a sovereignty analysis in this context.180 
                                                          
 175.  See id. at 233 (“[B]oth tribal self-governance and public safety are better served when 
tribes exercise a central role in providing public safety and criminal justice on Indian reserva-
tions.” (quoting Law Enforcement in Indian Country: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 
110th Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Professor Kevin K. Washburn))). 
 176.  Memorandum from Ronald Weich, supra note 5.  
 177.  See Native Women: Protecting, Shielding, and Safeguarding Our Sisters, Mothers, and 
Daughters: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 8–9 (2011) (prepared 
statement of Thomas J. Perrelli, Associate Attorney General) (“[T]he common thread that ran 
through nearly all the tribal input focused on the need for greater tribal jurisdiction over domestic-
violence cases.”). 
 178.  OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 29, at 15. 
 179.  Hart & Lowther, supra note 115, at 233. 
 180.  See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Professor Prakash’s theory). 
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For Section 117 to be respectful of tribal sovereignty, the law should 
only be operative through a waiver.  Under this framework, the federal gov-
ernment will not be permitted to enforce Section 117 unless tribes elect to 
waive their sovereignty and allow the federal government to intervene 
against repeat offenders.181  The waiver must be renewed after a term of 
years and should be administered on a tribe-by-tribe basis.182  Hart and 
Lowther argue that waivers could be effective tools for addressing the un-
certainty regarding criminal jurisdiction over domestic violence in Indian 
country, which has been fueled by underlying sovereignty questions.183  
Further, this solution applies the logic underlying Professor Prakash’s trea-
ty-based theory by taking the form of a waiver .184  By allowing a waiver, 
legislatures could allow tribes to enter into consensual agreements implicat-
ing their tribal sovereignty.  Because the waiver is not an actual treaty, the 
government would not have to amend 25 U.S.C. § 71.185 
This proposed waiver process accounts for the “pitfalls of making 
sweeping claims about federal power over Indian tribes.”186  In particular, it 
acknowledges that while the federal government does not have plenary 
power over all Native American tribes, “one cannot conclude that each and 
every Indian tribe is the equivalent of Mexico or Canada, with the federal 
government utterly powerless to regulate internal tribal affairs.”187  By in-
corporating Professor Prakash’s argument regarding fungibility,188 this 
                                                          
 181.  In addition to respecting tribal sovereignty, this amendment could have positive practical 
consequences.  It could function to conserve the federal government’s resources by concentrating 
prosecutions in those tribes that explicitly wish to work with the federal government.  It could also 
bolster communication between tribal and federal governments, such that tribes would be more 
likely to know whether the federal government is acting on a given case. 
 182.  Though this proposed amendment is based on Professor Prakash’s theory, it differs in 
several ways.  For instance, unlike the treaties that Professor Prakash suggests would endow Con-
gress with plenary power to “regulate all aspects of that Indian tribe,” this waiver process would 
only address the federal government’s ability to override tribal sovereignty over repeat Native 
American domestic violence offenders.  Prakash, supra note 103, at 1111–12. 
 183.  Hart & Lowther, supra note 115, at 226.  Professors Hart and Lowther note:  
Perhaps the most controversial and potentially most effective mechanism for ensuring 
the safety of Native American women who are the victims of domestic violence would 
be a federal congressional statute waiving the jurisdictional restrictions outlined by the 
Supreme Court in Oliphant, which held that tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian Country. 
Id.  
 184.  See infra Part II.D.1. 
 185.  See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 186.  Prakash, supra note 103, at 1114. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. at 1074 (“Once we stop stereotyping the tribes, we can begin to appreciate how the 
Constitution authorizes various types of relationships with Indian nations, and, indeed, any na-
tion.”). 
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waiver process is consistent with how the tribes wish to be treated.189  For 
example, as advocated by a leader of the Tulalip Tribes, “[t]ribes are 
unique.  We are sovereign governments and we have unique needs, and 
need to be treated as such.”190 
1.  The Structure of the Waiver Program Respects Tribal 
Sovereignty 
That this proposed amendment adopts the procedural requirement of a 
waiver is noteworthy because waivers have been regarded as a procedural 
tool for safeguarding tribal sovereignty.191  First, waivers function to “rem-
edy the enforcement void faced by Native American women who attempt to 
prosecute their abusers.”192  Second, waivers “allow tribes to choose wheth-
er to accept jurisdiction, thus avoiding problems for those tribes lacking the 
institutional mechanisms for effective tribal law enforcement and prosecu-
tion.”193  The procedural format of a waiver will expand tribal control in the 
realm of criminal domestic violence jurisdiction by requiring explicit con-
sent,194 and, therefore, will be consistent with the considerations that indi-
cate whether a law respects tribal sovereignty.195 
2.  The Waiver Program Is Constitutional 
A treaty-based waiver program that would grant plenary power over 
all aspects of a particular Native American tribe could be consistent with 
the Congress’s power in the Constitution, so long as the waivers are con-
                                                          
 189.  See supra note 172. 
 190.  OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 29, at 26. 
 191.  Hart & Lowther, supra note 115, at 226–28.  Note that the waiver or opt-in format has 
been proposed as a policy solution in the similar, but slightly different context of non-Native 
American perpetrators of domestic violence against Native American victims in Indian country.  
Id. 
 192.  Id. at 227. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Marie Quasius suggests a waiver program that would address jurisdiction over non-
Native American defendants.  Quasius, supra note 122, at 1940.  The differences between her 
proposed waiver program and the waiver provision advocated herein are significant and should 
therefore be noted.  The most obvious difference is that the waiver program advocated herein ad-
dresses criminal jurisdiction over only Native American perpetrators of domestic violence, and 
specifically in the context of Section 117, over only repeat offenders.  Additionally, the some of 
the programs Quasius suggests involve an affirmative assumption of jurisdiction by the tribes; 
whereas, the waiver program articulated in this Comment could involve either an acknowledgment 
that the criminal jurisdiction of the tribe is not exclusive or an abrogation of criminal jurisdiction 
over repeat offenders entirely, depending on the specific provisions of the waiver adopted by the 
specific tribe.  Id. 
 195.  See supra Part II.C. 
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ducted on a tribe-by-tribe basis.196  As previously noted, however, this 
waiver program would not confer plenary power over all aspects of the spe-
cific Native American tribe that agrees to it; rather, it only provides notice 
to the federal government that the tribe acknowledges its concurrent crimi-
nal jurisdiction granted by Section 117 and grants permission to prosecute 
offenders pursuant to that jurisdiction.197  If a treaty-based program that 
grants plenary power over all aspects of tribal life can be constitutional, it 
follows that a waiver that confers a narrower scope of authority to Congress 
over that tribe would also be constitutional.198 
Marie Quasius has discussed the possibility of adopting waiver-based 
or opt-in programs concerning tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Native 
Americans who perpetrate domestic violence against Native Americans ex-
plored the constitutionality of such proposals.199  In discussing a proposed 
opt-in program, Quasius argues that the Supreme Court has affirmed the in-
herent authority of tribes to prosecute and punish non-Native Americans.200  
She notes that when a tribe’s authority is inherent rather than delegated,201 
“the source of the power is the tribe and the tribe is not limited to the ful-
fillment of a narrow congressional directive.”202  Though Quasius’s argu-
ment does not address whether a tribe’s authority to prosecute domestic vio-
lence perpetrated by one of its members against another is inherent or 
delegated, the Court’s discussion of Section 117 in Bryant suggests that 
tribal authority in this area is appropriate.203  Accordingly, a waiver pro-
gram, which seeks to respect tribal sovereignty over criminal jurisdiction 
such as the one proposed herein,204 is constitutional because it functions to 
                                                          
 196.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; see also Prakash, supra note 103, at 1073 (noting that even 
though the Constitution does not grant plenary power over Native American tribes generally, it 
“establishes a framework that allows the federal government to acquire plenary power over 
tribes”). 
 197.  See supra Part II.D.1. 
 198.  Logically, if a waiver confers plenary power over all aspects of the tribe, that would in-
clude the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction.  Accordingly, if Congress could be constitutionally capable 
of assuming power over the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction through a grant of plenary power in a 
waiver, it should also be constitutionally capable of assuming power over the tribe’s criminal ju-
risdiction in a waiver without a grant of plenary power over all other aspects of tribal life. 
 199.  Id. at 1924–25 (“An opt-in program would provide a gradual transition to full tribal juris-
diction over sexual assault and other criminal matters and would assuage any concerns that non-
Indian defendants will not receive due process.”). 
 200.  Id. at 1925–26. 
 201.  Tribal authority is delegated when “the source of the power is Congress, and the tribe 
merely exercises the narrow powers granted by Congress.”  Id. at 1926. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  United States v. Bryant, 126 S. Ct. 1954, 1960 (2016) (“Although federal law generally 
governs in Indian country, Congress has long excluded from federal-court jurisdiction crimes 
committed by an Indian against another Indian.”). 
 204.  See supra Part II.D.1. 
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recognize and bolster the scheme of inherent versus delegated authority that 
has been adopted by the Court.205 
3.  The Waiver Program Is Consistent with the Structure and Goals 
of the Native American Provisions of the VAWA 
The proposed waiver program is consistent with the structure and 
goals of the provisions governing crimes against Native American women 
in the most recent VAWA.206  Congress had at least three goals in enacting 
the Native American provisions of the 2005 VAWA: “1) decreasing vio-
lence against Native American women; 2) bolstering tribal sovereignty to 
enable tribes to better respond to Native American victims of domestic vio-
lence; and 3) ensuring perpetrator accountability for violence.”207 
The proposed waiver program would further each of these goals.  First, 
by requiring increased coordination between the tribal and federal govern-
ments in handling prosecutions of repeat Native American domestic vio-
lence offenders, this waiver program would function to increase the efficacy 
of the offense created in Section 117 in minimizing domestic violence.208  
Second, by selecting a structure that procedurally maximizes tribal sover-
eignty and control, this waiver program would further the second goal of 
the VAWA to reinforce tribal sovereignty by helping tribes better attend to 
the needs of domestic violence victims.209  Last, the increased coordination 
that will occur as a result of increased communication between the govern-
ment and the tribes regarding their waivers will provide tribal courts and 
federal prosecutors with greater notice about who will prosecute a given 
case.210 
                                                          
 205.  See Quasius, supra note 122, at 1926 (discussing the Court’s scheme of authority, as ad-
dressed in Duro and applied in Lara, and noting that “the Supreme Court affirmed the inherent, 
not delegated, authority of tribes to prosecute and punish nonmember Indians”). 
 206.  This Comment discusses the goals of the Native American provisions of the 2005 
VAWA for two reasons.  First, because the Bryant Court emphasized the 2005 VAWA over the 
2013 VAWA; second, because Section 117 was first enacted in the 2005 VAWA, the specific 
goals that Congress had in mind in enacting Section 117 are particularly relevant in the discussion 
of a possible amendment of the policy. 
 207.  Hart & Lowther, supra note 115, at 221–22.  Congress is not the only branch of the fed-
eral government that has articulated goals in this area.  The executive branch has also stated that it 
has “placed a high priority on combating violence against women in tribal communities.”  Memo-
randum from Ronald Weich, supra note 5.  
 208.  See supra Part II.C. 
 209.  Hart & Lowther, supra note 115, at 221–22; see also supra Parts II.C, Part II.D. 
 210.  See supra Part II.A. 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
A close examination of the Supreme Court’s tribal sovereignty doc-
trine in the domestic violence context reveals that it is outdated and lacks 
sufficient constitutional grounding to support211 the conclusion that Con-
gress has plenary power over all Native American tribes.212  This revelation, 
combined with the predominant view among scholars and tribal leaders that 
increased tribal control is necessary to effectively minimize domestic vio-
lence,213 suggests that both the Court and Congress must incorporate greater 
respect for tribal sovereignty into tribal law to combat the epidemic of do-
mestic violence in Indian country effectively.214 
The Court’s decision in United States v. Bryant, which upholds Sec-
tion 117 of the VAWA, is indicative of the problems that underlie the cur-
rent approach to sovereignty.215  After analyzing the effects of Section 117 
on tribal sovereignty, the law as it currently stands must be amended to ac-
cord greater respect to the authority of the tribes.  This Comment suggests 
that a waiver program requiring each individual tribe to consent to the fed-
eral government’s authority to prosecute repeat offenders before the gov-
ernment can take action is a potential solution for balancing the interests of 
the federal government against respect for tribal sovereignty.216 
                                                          
 211.  See supra Part I.C.2. 
 212.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 213.  See supra Part II.C. 
 214.  See supra Part I.A. 
 215.  See supra Part II.A. 
 216.  See supra Part II.D.1. 
